
Defeatocrats take notice: The good news is becoming so frequent in Iraq, that even the anti-war MSM can’t ignore it anymore:
—- The AP reports: Dramatic progress seen in Baghdad neighborhood (Amariyah) (which I blogged about earlier here)
—– The NYT, of all places, reports today that according to the US, Al Qaeda in Iraq have been run out of Baghdad. Andy McCarthy writes more about the story here, and notes that the NYT saw fit to not put this anywhere near the front page. Captain Ed rightly approaches the news with cautious optimism.
—– The WaPo has more on the news about Iraqis returning to Baghdad as the result of the decline in violence.
With all this going on, what are the Democrats in Congress doing? Crafting another cut and run resolution, in another apparent show of solidarity with candidates Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama on the lack of concern about the strong likelihood that the US pulling out of Iraq too soon would lead to genocide. So much for their phony claims about being the “caring and compassionate” party.
ST reader GWR, in the thread on Michael Yon’s iconic picture, says it best:
And if the likes of Edwards, Obama, Clinton, Pelosi, Murtha, Reid, Kennedy, Kerry, et al have their way, every one of these good people will die a gruesome painful death at the hands of the islamofascists.
This picture shows interfaith in action. It is a testimony to the fact that our soldiers’ sacrifices in Iraq have not been in vain. We would not deserve to be trusted anywhere in the world if we permit the left to abandon another people who rely on us for protection from terrorists.
Amen.
Prior:
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Not content with success and improving conditions in Iraq, the Democrats are once again attempting to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Hey, anything to keep GWBush from realizing a success, what’s a few hundred thousand dead Iraqi’s and a major hit to US credibility compared to getting even with that nasty ol’Chimpy McHitler eh?
And yes, I most decidedly do question their patriotism.
In the event of a GOP win in 2008, what are the odds that when the leftists’ navel gazing shows them the error of their ways, they’ll somehow try to blame GW and Rove?

Good news is always welcome. But AQ was always only 3-5% in Iraq. That really hasn’t been the problem. The problem is the Sunni and Shia conflict. Presently the ethnic separation and walling in of ethnic groups has had an impact — the troop build up helped, too it appears.
However, there has been next to no political progress on the 8 points or bench marks that Bush mentioned in his Sotu in January. In this month those eight marks were to be completed.
Presently, the ethnic tensions are corked in a pressurized bottle contained by Iraqi patience and the US occupation. They know we are stretched to limit and will draw-down in half a year.
Southern Iraq is still a hot bed of trouble and sectarian violence could swell at anytime with the Brits having gone home for all purposes. And the north for all it’s lack of violence is now politically unstable with the pkk edging into Turkey at will.
Good news is always welcome. But established goals, social contracts and political reconciliation are even better. Without those benchmarks the bottle can lose its cork anytime when US pressure goes lax.
I’d like to read your link regarding the
dj claims,
AQ disagrees with you. They consider this the central front in the war against the infidels.
Zawahiri’s letter two years ago to Zarqawi, for example:
Bin Laden himself begs to differ with you:
They would not be devoting only 3-5% of their resources to their most crucial battle.
As for the sectarian strife, you may have a point, but your focus is on the past rather than the future. Even in this area, conditions are improving.
However, let’s assume you’re right for the moment, and that Iraq will implode the second we leave, no matter how long we stay. What’s your solution? I’d argue that the possibility of sectarian violence is a reason to stay, not to abandon the task. If our presence is showing all signs of being a positive force, we need to remain until the Iraqi defense forces can deal with sectarian violence by themselves, while continuing to obliterate terrorists wherever found and while building the foundation for Sunni-Shia cooperation in a unified Iraq.
On AQI being 3 to 5%:
LINK 1
Perhaps you are right that my emphasis on the past is much accented regarding this war. I would suggest that when doing counter insurgency strategy one must, as Gen. P. did in Sept., rely a tremendous amount on histo-statistically accented data to support a particular conclusion regarding a state of affairs one way or another, that is, for him, progress taking affect and holding.
…my solution for Iraq requires much time to unfold. I’ll say this, however, there does appear now to be a stability of sorts (for manifold reasons)instead of former total decent into chaos for the patient; albeit she is not yet off the critical condition list. Hence, when our tired “doctors” must leave- and they must- next spring, their troop rotations now maxed out, as they are now physically fatigued (3-4 tours common)
LINK 2
and their needed equipment untimely even now,
LINK 3
one is forced to look at the given circumstances of limitations borne of necessity and certainty.
With a topped-out military resource and technical resource there’s even the coupled burden that Iraqi’s now view our stay as an unwelcome one:
“According to this [Sept] poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC and NHK to assess the effects of the US military’s surge strategy, 70 percent of Iraqis believe the strategy has made Iraq’s security situation worse. The poll finds 47 percent of Iraqis want US-led forces to leave Iraq immediately and 34 percent want the troops to leave when the security situation improves. The results of the survey indicate the surge has hampered conditions for political dialogue, reconstruction and economic development and has not improved security. The findings come as US Commander General David Petraeus prepares to deliver his own assessment of the ‘surge’ strategy to Congress.”
LINK 4
Additionally, with 99% of our assistance forces leaving or left, the Brits in the South, practically speaking, having left the land to Hakim and Sadr’s forces; Northern kurdish politics standing like a drunk over a ledge; the West hoping (against any evidence) for political participation and integration Parliament; the Iranian East poking a stick in our eye like a teasing teen; one, examining the gravity of the events, involved cannot continue to hold 300 lbs over one’s head for too long without it falling on him given the phyics of the equation.
According to your Wikipedia link, the “3-5%” level, if accurate, would add up to somewhere between 17,000 and 33,000 Sunni insurgents. That strikes me as an extremely high figure, especially in light of the momentum in the Sunni regions, such as Anbar, toward cooperation with the Allies and the government.
And yet they continue to re-up and volunteer for deployment there. Never underestimate the determination of our soldiers and Marines to get the job done.
If longer times between tours are needed, I’d suggest pulling troops out of places where they’re no longer needed – South Korea, western Europe, Kosovo – and working them into the rotation.
Your dispute should not be with the policy-makers then, it should be with an intransigent congressional leadership that hasn’t passed a single funding bill this year as it panders to their extremist base.
I’d be really careful about relying on anything compiled by a U.N. agency. You’re certainly aware that polls can be engineered to yield the desired conclusions. A healthy dose of skepticism is in order when pro-jihadi organs like the UN and the BBC produce results like that. Signs like the reopening of businesses and refugees returning to rebuild are better indicators of how the Iraqi people view the current situation.
I don’t think this is what he is saying. He is saying of the people fighting against Iraq and the American occupation, Al Queda makes up 3-5% of them.
This seems to be accuarte, from what I recall. However, AQ consists of almost 100% of the roadside bombings and the vast majority of civilian casualties. The violence they produce fasr out weighs any secterian strife produced.
I disagree with dj’s evaluation though. I believe secterian tensions are easing. It never was a “civil war” as some claim, but there was violence. At this point it is nominal comparitively, as factions are actually beginning to cooperate so they can move towards a political solution.
This can not be acheived until security is maintained though.
“However, AQ consists of almost 100% of the roadside bombings and the vast majority of civilian casualties. The violence they produce far out weighs any secterian strife produced.”
I respectfully request links for that claim.
I understand it very differently:
…
“The real challenge always has been the lack of intelligence about bomb-making cells, which often are tolerated, if not actually supported, by much of the Iraqi population. U.S. forces have had some successes. [Retired General Montgomery] Meigs says that since January 2005, 221 network leaders have either been captured or killed. Of those, 11 were classified as Tier 1 leadership, national level insurgent commanders or prominent al Qaeda in Iraq leaders such as the Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Seventy-six were classified as Tier 2 or regional leaders; 134 were deemed Tier 3, local cell leaders.”
…
LINK 1
Meigs also stated:
…
“Those assessing the IED threat in Iraq divide the adversary into three basic sections.
“Those associated with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia strive for the spectacular bombing, of a mosque, government building or marketplace, to generate hostility and headlines and foment sectarian tensions.
“Those placed by Shiite forces are increasingly sophisticated in technology, able to puncture armored vehicles. The Sunni-based insurgency plants bombs of a more home-made variety, but still deadly.”
LINK 2
From this perspective it appears the non-AQ Sunni-based insurgency is the biggest killer in Iraq.
If this is the case, and i would continue to argue that it is, that the Sunni-based movement was ,and to some degree still is, involved in the insurgent activity in Iraq, then it may explain
the decline in bombings and killings, as the ‘Awakening Movement is predominantly a Sunni-based form, as evidenced from Al-anbar’s recovery to some law and order.
While “sectarian tensions are easing,” apparently, the easement may be built on underlying tentative realities, as walled societies (as in Baghdad), the Awakening Movement sick of AQI, and in helping the Americans defeat AQI, the Americans in turn, will force Maliki into political compromise with the Sunnis, and finally, perhaps, the vast majority of sectarian cleaning is now completed:
(See the charts and commentary on p.34)
LINK 3
In any case, the weight of potential instabilities in Iraq still exceeds this moments US pressure of (localized) stability– therefore, given the US’s limited resources, and the realistic potential for a future constant of instability the alternatives are, again, limited to withdrawing before Iraq gravity equals or overcomes US resistance to it.
Thanks for the four links on AQI being 3 to 5% dj. At the conclusion of this lengthy post, I suppose my concern regarding the AQI involvement is fairly clear and for those who either don’t wish or have the time to read the findings and conclusions that make up the brunt of this comment, go there. The Jones report (dj’s link) is long.
I’m glad that the NYT, Reuters and the UN have been so supportive of our efforts as shown with their biased reporting and flat out opposition to expedite the WOT. Especially since the UN building was attacked in 03 it is less than capable and more than sad.
note: This should not be considered an assault in any way with respect to your comments. In fact the more informed I become, based in part from your last three links, I found this interesting development, which too is good news.
THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ CONCLUSIONS,KEY FINDINGS,AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—Military and Police
Finding 1: Although the Iraqi Army and Special Forces have demonstrated significant progress in counterterrorism capabilities at the operational level, the Iraqi Police Service and National Police have many challenges to overcome and cannot yet meaningfully contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Iraq. The border security forces are assessed as being ineffective.
Finding 2: The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring greater security to Iraq’s provinces varies by region and by organization within the ISF owing to many factors, including political leadership, security environment, sectarianism, and available resources.
Finding 3: The “clear, hold, build” strategy being implemented by Iraqi Security Forces is on the right track and shows potential, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the police forces can execute these types of operations independently.
Finding 4: The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.
Conclusion: The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability, but not the ability to operate independently. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military and external threats.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
Al Qaeda in Iraq was credited with only 15 percent of the insurgent attacks in Iraq at the beginning of 2007, but its attacks were typically the most destructive, sensational, and destabilizing. According to the Department of Defense, al Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for approximately 90 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq and the kidnapping of more than 250 foreign workers. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir—an Egyptian—has been al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader since the death of the organization’s founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in a Coalition air strike on June 7, 2006. Although al Qaeda in Iraq’s leadership is foreign—a reality that members have tried to hide through information operations—its makeup is likely 90–95 percent Iraqi. Even so, 80 percent of al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bombings are carried out by foreigners. The relationship between al Qaeda in Iraq and the greater al Qaeda leadership in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region remains unclear, but the groups share common goals and openly support one another through the media and sworn loyalty oaths.